General:
- 200x soldiers (Total 45,400)
- 6x APC
- 7x tanks
- 4x Artillery (0x MLRS)
- 6x vehicles
- 4x Air defense systems
- 9x UAV
- 1x Helicopter
Belarus:
There continues to be movement of RU S-300 missile containers to SE Belarus, in hypothesized preparation for a large salvo in the next 48 hours. At minimum, 60 S-300 missiles are known to have been staging in Zyabrivka, some 22km from the border and 200km from Kyiv.
Reportedly, the maximum range of an S-300 in a ground attack capacity is about 120-150km. If these missiles are transported to the southernmost tip of Belarus, just NE of Chernobyl, they would be technically capable of striking the Kyiv government quarter.
Kyiv/ West Ukraine (1):
The UA government continues to issue warnings regarding RU missile strikes on the 24th, especially around the Kyiv government quarter where employees have been advised to work from home and a large number of government employees were instructed to work remotely as well.
UA CIC Zaluzhny stated that about 9000 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers have been KIA thus far into the war. He did not elaborate on other branches, National guard, TDF, or wounded. This is currently the latest official statement by UA government officials regarding causality count.
Per the UA border guards, the rate of men attempting to avoid conscription and mobilization by leaving the country has not abated, with 20-50 people a day attempting to smuggle themselves across, and another 150 being rejected. Currently, the draft order for businesses to allow mobilization-capable employees to travel abroad for up to a week is not in force.
Sumy/Chernihiv (2):
While some harassing strikes continue along the Sumy/Chernihiv border, the night passed quietly. There has been a noted decrease in strikes over the past 72 hours, which has caused concern about RU forces preparing for a larger salvo on the 24th.
An RU drone was shot down immediately outside of Sumy city.
Kharkiv (3):
RU forces did not conduct ground assaults N of Kharkiv, instead using airstrikes and artillery strikes as regular against UA troop positions in the NE, closer to the Siversky Donets river and potentially capable of menacing RU supply lines. There has been an increase in airstrikes leveraged against UA positions near Stariy Saltiv.
RU forces have continued to fire missiles into Kharkiv, with a number of S-300 missiles being launched from Belgorod, targeting predominantly civilian areas.
RU drone recon has increased over the Kharkiv region, and airstrikes over the NE. RU media stated that UA lines are within 500 meters of Rubizhne, and as such are a concern for menacing RU supply lines in Vovchansk.
Izyum/Lyman (4):
RU forces have continued limited offensives S of Izyum, with no reported success. These appear to be recon in force, rather then large assaults.
Siversk/Lysychansk (5)
RU forces continue to strike to the SE of Siversk, around Ivano-darivka and Spirne, in an attempt to break through to the southern-accessing highway of Siversk. Additionally, RU forces continue to shell into Soledar and its environs.
There is apparent footage of RU LPR/DPR forces fighting inside Soledar proper, rather then simply continuing to sit outside and shell it.
Popasna/Bakhmut:
Around Bakhmut, Russians continue to focus their assaults to the NE and SE of the city rather then advancing along the main highway, which must cross several km of flat fields before reaching a heavily reinforced industrial area.
RU forces are believed to have taken the southern of the two towns named Zaitseve, a UA hardpoint south of Bakhmut. The main (northern) Zaitseve hardpoint closer to Bakhmut remains under assault, but in UA hands. RU forces continue to agress from essentially 270 degrees around Kodema, which is a UA hardpoint that sits right along a defensive line set up in 2014, and were repelled by UA artillery.
Donetsk (6):
On the outskirts of Donetsk city, one of the DPR battalions HQ's is currently on fire following UA strikes. Additionally, a large ammo depot in the E of Donetsk city exploded today, reportedly after a UA missile strike.
An SBU operation was able to identify and detain two RU spotters who were correcting RU rocket attacks. Reportedly among their notes was the presence of at least 1 HIMARS unit, and local critical infrastructure such as powerplants. The capture of these informers helps to indicate what RU priorities currently are- long range artillery systems and heating infrastructure.
UA SOF released video footage of them detonating bridges in the Donbas behind RU lines in order to interrupt supply lines. Additionally, UA command further indicated that supply arteries are of primary interest for strike missions.
Mariupol (7):
RU appears to be moving forwards with plans to hold mass sham trials regarding UA soldiers in Mariupol on the 24th. Zelensky has both stated that such an event would result in the cancelling of any peace talks, and has urged UN and international observers to cover the event should it occur.
The UN denied reports that it visited and assessed the safety of UA POW's, per a russian PR release the other day.
Zaporizhia/Southern Axis (8):
RU forces staged a shooting of a civilian car near the ZNPP and set fire to the central heating infrastructure in the city. RU blamed the event on UA partisans, but video footage indicates that the car and its occupants were machine gunned at extremely close range in an area under heavy RU control.
RU has made a request in the UN to hold a meeting on the 23rd regarding the situation around ZNPP, which is believed to be a legal mechanism to interrupt any other meetings revolving around whatever actions RU takes on the 23rd-25th.
RU officials have begun classifying all UA citizens fleeing fighting in Zaporizhia oblast as asylum seekers and refugees, thus acredditing them RU citizens and requiring their registration and issuance of ID cards.
Kherson (9):
RU forces have apparently been stalled to the SW near Oleksandrivka following UA airstrikes to stop a counter-attack.
The RU armored forces to the North towards Blahtodne are apparently being supported with heavy RU artillery, who has allegedly received orders to heavily prioritize UA artillery positions over all others. There have been reportedly double digit artillery system losses over the weekend by UA forces, and the corresponding present lack of artillery support has been somewhat exploited by the RU armored platoon. There are unconfirmed reports that Blahodatne has been captured by this force.
RU forces are attempting to target the UA bridgehead over the Inhulets river with long range fires and airstrikes.
Another explosion was visualized on the Antonovsky bridge, where the fire appears to be coming from the bridge itself rather then the in-progress RU pontoon bridge lashed to its side.
RU forces shelled Mykolaiv again with what is believed to be a set of 4 S-300 missiles, damaging a cafe. Additionally, an air-launched Kh-31 cruise missile was intercepted, having been fired from somewhere over Crimea or the Caspian sea.
RU aircraft launched 8 airstrikes today, and UA carried out 5 airstrikes. The UA airstrikes targeted the Antonovsky bridge, either inflicted or verified heavy damage at the Kakhovka dam bridge, and destroyed an RU ammo depot immediately next to the bridge.
RU occupation government officials hung up a RU tricolor at a school for a flag day event (Aug 22nd in Russia) , which was taken down by partisans and set on fire.
A soldier from the 108th Guards Assault regiment surrendered to UA units on the frontlines closer to Mykolaiv, indicating the unit composition currently engaged on the frontlines.
Odessa/Black Sea/Crimea(10):
Reportedly in the black sea, there are 3 missile ships and 1 submarine with about 28 missiles available for use.
RU forces fired a pair of air-launched long range Kh-59 cruise missiles into infrastructure around Odesa, from over the Black sea. Its believed they targeted areas further S of Odesa city proper, over the Dniester river.
The greatest losses were in the Kherson region.
The Pentagon reported they would be sending 10 switchblade 600 long-range suicide drones/loitering munitions, which carry a larger explosive payload and have an increased range. Apparently, there have been complications given the fact the drones are still considered in the prototyping and testing stages. Additionally, the US is in preparation to supply additional high precision long-range excalibur shells.
UA IT companies are on track to raise some 850k USD to purchase a number of UAVs for recon and combat use, for the UA armed forces. Thus far, since the fundraiser began some 24 hours ago, they are 1/3rd of the way there. Reportedly, some 475 drones have been crowdfunded by Ukrainians since the war began.
Reportedly, the LPR will begin "general mobilization" on September 1st per UA intel agencies. This mobilization will first target citizens with RU passports, and then all men between the ages of 18-65. This is in line with the forced conscription of everyone from mine workers to students in recent weeks. There are reports that RU wants to consolidate 10,000 new soldiers from the occupied territories.
RU is apparently expanding its recruitment efforts for "volunteer battalions", with emphasis placed on ethnic minorities and impoverished individuals. Apparently, this is not only due to the fact they are more receptive to financial incentives, but also explicitly stated that this will help reduce instances of protest or dissent as the economic situation in Russia continues to falter.
Also, RU is increasingly recruiting in the Western russian cities, which indicates that they are not getting the requisite number of soldiers from these further east and less ethnically russian (and thus frankly less cared for by the RU government and ethnic russians), and has to expand its efforts.
Deputies of the German parliament are in favor of expanding military aid to Ukraine, even if it temporarily weakens the military potential of the German army. This was stated by members from 3 different leading parties.